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Economic Determinants of Conflict:                      
An Empirical study of North East Indian States 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The North Eastern region of India has been adversely affected by ethnic clashes, insurgency 
and counter insurgency since independence. It is generally agreed among theoreticians 
(Hirschman, 1978; Bhattacharjee, 1989; Verghese, 1996; Hazarika, 2004) that the 
underdevelopment of northeast Indian states has been a serious matter of concern for years 
now. Existing literature and newspaper reports mention ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, 
illegal migration, conflict over natural resources/ property rights and poor governance and 
delivery of public goods resulting in unequal distribution across various ethnic groups as 
some of the most important drivers of conflict in North East India12345. Various insurgent 
outfits have been indulging in armed conflict for decades in most of the north eastern states 
on these grounds. History shows that ethnic conflict in the north-east has social and cultural 
roots. The turmoil has more to do with ethnic political aspirations and the effort to protect 
local territories and resources.(Shimray,2004)et al. 
Conflict is multi-causal and multi-dimensional and can result from a combination of the 
following factors6: 
 
 Political and institutional factors: Weak public institutions, political exclusion, 
breakdown in social contract, corruption and identity politics/ xenophobia. 
 Socioeconomic factors: inequality, exclusion and marginalisation, absence or 
weakening of social cohesion, poverty, multi-ethnic groups with varying access to 
resources and public goods. 
 Resource and environmental factors: scarcity of national resources often due to 
population growth leading to environmental insecurity, resource exploitation  
 
Olson,(1965); Smith, D(2004), Hoeffler, A., (2012) et al. suggest that each of these 
factors may cause or be an impact of a conflict. 
 
                                                          
1 Mander, H, Nellie: India’s forgotten massacre, The Hindu, December 14, 2008 : 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-sundaymagazine/article1437892.ece 
2 Ashirwad A, et al. Targeting the Other, Frontline, 26th December, 2014 http://www.frontline.in/cover-
story/targeting-the-other/article6672263.ece 
3Langer, A, Northeasts’s reverse racism, 
http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main53.asp?filename=Ne210712Northeast.asp 
4 Oinam B, Patterns of Ethnic Conflict in the North-East: A Study on Manipur, Economic and Political Weekly 
Vol. 38, No. 21 (May 24-30, 2003), pp. 2031-2037 
5 Ethnic Clashes And Bomb Blasts Have Killed Over 1000 In Assam in the last 15 Years, India Times, march 
2015, http://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/ethnic-clashes-and-bomb-blasts-have-killed-over-1000-in-assam-
in-the-last-15-years-230927.html 
6 Understanding violent conflict, GSDRC  
http://www.gsdrc.org/go/conflict/chapter-1-understanding-violent-conflict/the-causes-of-conflict-part-1- 
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2. Literature Review 
 
While the Marxian argument that income inequality is one of the main causes for social 
conflict may hold true in some instances (Ray et al., 2011), other factors like cultural, 
biological, educational, occupational, lingual, racial, historical and socio- political 
differences also play equally important role. Existing literature suggests that racial and 
linguistic diversity plays a crucial role in triggering social conflict. An ethnically diverse 
society may be more prone to conflicts (Braubaker and Laitin 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003a; 
Esteban and Ray, 2011 et al). Do and Iyer (2010) found evidence that greater caste diversity 
is associated with higher level of conflict. Ethnic Conflict may be a factor of low economic 
growth (Easterly and Levene 1997; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005b), high corruption 
(Mauro1995), low social adherence and participation (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000), low 
contribution to local public goods(Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Bossert 
et al. (2011) and reduced literacy and schooling (Alesina et al. 2003). 
 
The literature on the subject also suggests that the incidence of conflict is negatively 
correlated with quality of governance (La Porta et. al. 1999), size of government social 
expenditure (Alesina et al. 2001) or social capital (Collier and Gunning, 2000). 
 
Esteban and Ray (2011) describe a theory of conflict incidence where distributional measures 
are important factors. They introduce three indices which according to them explain conflict. 
The three related concepts are discussed below. 
 
If there are m groups engaged in conflict, with Ni the number of individuals in groupi, N the 
total population, and the distance across two groups i and j is given by dij, then 
 
Polarization P = ∑ ∑ 𝑛2𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑖=1 dij 
 
Greenberg-Gini index  G =∑ ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑖=1 dij 
 
Ethnic fractionalization F = ∑ ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑚
𝑗≠1
𝑚
𝑖=1  = ∑ 𝑛𝑖(1 − 𝑛𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 ) 
 
Where, 𝑛𝑖 ≡  
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
 is the population share of group i. 
 
The following table lists some of the important studies carried out in this subject, along with 
their objective, methodology and variables and major conclusions  
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Table 1.1 Some important studies on Conflict: tools and methods 
Study Objective Independent 
Variables 
Method Conclusion 
 
Alberto Alesina and 
Eliana La Ferrara, 
2005 
Using the updated data set 
of Alesina, Arnaud 
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, 
Sergio Kurlat, and 
Wacziarg (2003), the 
study tests whether the 
negative correlation 
between ethnic 
fragmentation and growth 
holds irrespective of the 
level of economic 
development. Data relates 
to 215 countries and 
stretches over 40 years 
Decade dummies for 
1960's, 70's, 80's 
Dummy for Sub-
Saharian 
Africa, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 
Dummy for 
democracy, 
Log of initial income, 
Log of schooling, 
Assassinations, 
Financial Depth, 
Black Market 
premium, 
Fiscal Surplus/GDP, 
Log of telephones per 
worker. 
Seemingly 
Unrelated 
Regression. 
Public goods 
provisions are 
lower in 
fragmented 
societies.  
Productivity’s 
relation to 
diversity varies 
according to the 
political and 
economic factors 
of a  country 
 
 
 
 
Javier Gardeazabal, 
(2011) 
 
This paper investigates the 
relationship between 
linguistic fragmentation 
and conflict through a case 
study in the Basque 
Country 
Assassinations, 
Conflict Index, 
Population, linguistic 
Polarization, Political 
Polarization, Number 
of votes, 
Fraction of Population 
with Higher Studies, 
Unemployment Rate, 
Employment over 
Population, Population 
of People born Abroad 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments 
estimates for 
a dynamic 
panel data. 
Using data at the 
municipal level 
the study shows 
that linguistic 
polarization 
reduces 
the level of 
conflict and that 
A high level of 
the stock of 
human capital is 
beneficial for 
reducing conflict 
intensity. 
Political 
polarization does 
not affect conflict 
significantly 
Hae S. Kim,  
2006 
The study aims at finding 
major determinants of 
conflict in less developed 
countries. A panel data 
based on both conflict-
stricken and non-conflict 
stricken developing 
countries (140 countries in 
total), is used. The time 
span covered in the 
analysis is the 2000–2005 
Population growth , 
Gini, GDP growth, 
HDI, Religious 
Heterogeneity, Ethnic 
homogeneity, dummy 
for type of political 
system 
  
Econometric 
analysis            
(Logistic 
Regression) 
The empirical 
analysis verifies 
that political 
system, ethnic 
and racial 
differences are 
significantly 
associated with 
armed conflict 
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7 If there are m groups engaged in conflict, with 𝑁𝑖 the number of individuals in group 𝑖, 𝑁 the total population, 
and  the distance across two groups 𝑖 and 𝑗 given by 𝑑𝑖j ≡ 𝑢𝑖𝑖 −  𝑢𝑗𝑗 then, 
Polarization  P = ∑ ∑ 𝑛2𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑑𝑖j 
Greenberg-Gini index  G =∑ ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑑𝑖j 
Ethnic fractionalization F = ∑ ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑚
𝑗≠1
𝑚
𝑖=1  = ∑ 𝑛𝑖(1 − 𝑛𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 ) 
where 𝑛𝑖 ≡  
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
 is the population share of group 𝑖.  
 
period. 
Joan Esteban, Laura 
Mayoral, and Debraj 
Ray( 2012) 
The study examines 
empirically the impact of 
ethnic divisions on 
conflict through three 
indices of ethnic 
distribution: Polarization 
(P), fractionalization (F), 
and (G/N), where G= the 
Gini-Greenberg index7 
and N the total population 
of a state. The study 
covers 138 countries over 
1960–2008 
Polarization (P), 
fractionalization (F), 
and (G/N), where G= 
the Gini-Greenberg 
index and N the total 
population of a state, 
Population, Per capita 
GDP, oil/diamond 
dummy, 
Mountainous region 
dummy, Democracy 
dummy, Non-
contiguous states 
Theoretical 
model and 
Econometric 
analysis            
(Probit 
Regression) 
The empirical 
analysis verifies 
that these 
distributional 
measures are 
significant 
correlates of 
conflict. These 
effects persist as 
we introduce 
country specific 
measures of 
group cohesion 
and of the 
importance of 
public 
goods, and 
combine them 
with the 
distributional 
measures. 
 
 
José G. Montalvo and 
Marta Reynal- Querol 
(2002) 
This paper analyzes the 
role that different 
dimensions of ethnicity 
plays in the process of 
growth of a country using 
a and Barro (1991) 
Real GDP per capita, 
real domestic 
investment (private 
plus public) to real 
GDP, Percentage of 
secondary school 
attained in the total 
population, Percentage 
of ``Primary school 
attained'' in the total 
population, number of 
assassinations, 
religious polarization. 
Pooled 
Panel 
Regression  
The main finding 
is that religious 
conflict, is an 
important factor 
in explaining low 
economic growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
José G. Montalvo and 
Marta Reynal-Querol 
(2005) 
This paper analyses the 
relationship between 
ethnic polarization and the 
duration of civil 
Wars. 
Log GDP, Log 
Population, primary 
exports, mountain, 
non-contiguous states, 
degree of democracy, 
Logit 
Regression 
The results show 
that ethnically 
polarized 
countries have to 
endure longer 
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Source: Constructed through literature survey 
The review of literature suggests that many empirical studies have used some economic 
variables like economic growth, population, public expenditure etc in past. This study 
attempts to introduce some new economic variables related to resource exploitation, illegal 
migration and size of ethnic majority to address sociological and political issues that are 
peculiar to North eastern region of India. While empirical models of conflict have become 
much popular in recent economic literature, very few studies have been done in India so far. 
Sub-national studies on India hitherto include (Gomes 2011, Remoe 2010, de Soysa and 
Vadlamannati 2010 and 2011, Urdal 2008 and 2007). Although these studies analyse the 
causes of conflicts, only one paid attention to the North-Eastern region of India. This study 
attempts to fill this gap.                                                                                                                                          
 
 ethnic 
fractionalization, 
ethnic polarization, 
religious 
fractionalization, 
religious polarization 
civil 
wars than 
ethnically less 
polarized 
societies. 
 
Joseph Flavian Gomes 
(2011) 
Using sub national data on 
362 districts for 3 time 
periods the study to 
identify the causes of civil 
conflicts. 
 
Income inequality, 
percentages of 
Scheduled Castes & 
Tribes, Distance from 
state capital, Barren-
Rocky Dummy, 
proportion forest 
cover, log total area, 
consumption pc, land 
inequality, 
%Scheduled Castes, 
%Scheduled Tribes, 
Density, 
initial consumption pc, 
Prop. Non landlord, 
State and Time 
Dummies 
 
Pooled 
Probit, 
Pooled 
Negative 
Binomial 
regression 
The study finds 
evidence on how 
land inequality is 
extremely 
important for the 
Maoist conflict. 
Krishna Chaitanya 
Vadlamannati (2011) 
 
 
The study provides a 
quantitative test of 
whether deprivation and 
persistent economic and 
political discrimination 
affect the probability of 
armed conflict incidence 
across nine North-Eastern 
states of India during the 
period 1970–2007. 
Poverty rate, 
Economic and 
Political 
discrimination, GDP, 
Population pressures, 
Ethnic affiliations, 
Forest area, State 
capacity, Availability 
of arable land, 
Neighbouring conflict 
events, and distance to 
New Delhi. 
Econometric 
analysis                  
(Probit 
Regression 
and system 
GMM) 
Absolute Poverty, 
Relative poverty, 
economic and 
political 
discrimination of 
marginal groups 
in these regions 
are positively 
related to conflict 
outbreak 
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3. Objective 
The study will attempt to estimate the likelihood of armed conflict across the 8 north east 
Indian states, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Sikkim for a 
span of over 40 years (19728-2014). It will also attempt to study the association between 
armed conflict and economic /socio-political/ policy variables; and suggest relevant policy 
measures. 
 
4. Broad Research Questions 
 
While analysing the literature several questions arise, some specific to North East Region in  
India. 
 
1. What causes violent conflict? What are the major economic determinants of violent 
conflict in North East India? 
 
2. Is there two -way causality between economic growth and occurrence of violent 
conflict in these states? 
 
The above research questions lead us to the following hypothesis  
 
5. Hypotheses  
 
H1 : Economic Growth is negatively associated with the probability of incidence of 
Conflict 
H2 : Economic Inequality, poor delivery of public goods and poverty are positively 
associated with the probability of incidence of Conflict 
H3: There is two way causality between growth and incidence of Conflict 
  
6. Methodology 
 
The research questions posed above will be dealt with theoretically and empirically. The 
theoretical foundations for social conflict have been provided by Ray et al. For the purpose of 
this study these models will be evaluated in the specific context of the selected states. 
Attempt will be made to modify or suggest modification to these models to incorporate the 
valid explanation of the determinants.  
For empirical estimation-both time series analysis and a panel approach may be used. The 
analysis will be done using the data that would pertain to the eight north east Indian states 
viz. Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim for a span of over 
40 years (19729-2014) and will use economic, political, social and policy variables to 
estimate the likelihood of the occurrence of an armed conflict (As mentioned in the following 
section) 
                                                          
8 Since Meghalaya was the last state within the Northeastern region of India to attain full statehood in 1972, we 
chose our time span accordingly to incorporate data from all the eight independent states in the region. 
9 ibid 
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6.1 Empirical Analysis 
 
A binary dependent variable model will be used with time fixed effects and standard errors 
clustered at state level which assumes that the observations are non-independent within states 
but independent across. This will help us to estimate the likelihood of the occurrence of a 
conflict among the 8 North East Indian states. The choice of the specific binary dependent 
variable model will depend on the distribution of the estimated dependent variable. If Ŷ  
follows normal distribution, we will use a Probit estimator. We will attempt to estimate the 
relationship between occurrence of conflict and economic and socio-political factors that 
trigger it. 
 
Further, tests will be carried out to check if a two-way causality can be established between 
economic growth and incidence/ occurrence of conflict for every state. Appropriate tests of 
robustness will be carried out to validate the results.  
 
We estimate the relationship using the following specification: 
 
𝒀𝒊𝒕 =          𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝒀𝒊𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟐 (𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟒𝑫𝒊𝒕 +  𝝎𝒊𝒕     
 
Where, 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =Occurrence or incidence of conflict at time t 
𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 =Occurrence or incidence of conflict at time t-1 
𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 = Economic Variables at time t-1 
(𝑃𝑖𝑡−1)= Socio-Political variables at time t-1 
𝐷𝑖𝑡= Dummies 
𝜔𝑖𝑡= Error term 
 
 Dependent variable (it)  
 
1. Occurrence or incidence of conflict(binary) 
  Codes 1 for a year if there is a conflict in which casualties are 25 and above and 0 
otherwise.  
 
 
 Economic Variables(it-1) include 
 
2. Per capita Net State Domestic Product (log) 
NSDP per capita is expected to be negatively associated with likelihood of 
incidence of conflict. However, in a region like North East India, where growth 
faces many developmental/ sustainability constraints, NSDP per capita may be 
observed to be positively associated with likelihood of the occurrence of a 
conflict in some cases. 
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3. Fiscal Deficit 
4. Public Debt by Net State Domestic Product 
5. Own Tax Revenue by Population  
 
Fiscal deficit, own tax revenue per capita and Debt to NSDP ratio are good        
indicators of a state’s financial health. These variables are introduced to check if 
a state’s financial behaviour is associated with conflict. 
 
6. Social Allocation Ratio  
(State social expenditure/ Total expenditure by a state) is a good indicator of 
state’s ability to create public goods. Public Expenditures on health, education 
and other social expenditures are expected to be negatively associated with the 
likelihood of the occurrence of a conflict. 
 
7. Share of mining and petroleum in Net State Domestic Product  
This ratio measures the share of income generated in a state from its natural 
resources. In a mineral rich region like North East India it is expected to be 
positive, given that the mining areas are mostly inhabited by indigenous ethnic 
population across the 8 states. 
8. Forest area in Sq. Kms (log) 
Forest area is expected to be negatively associated with conflict. States with high 
forest area in time t is expected to have faced less resource exploitation in time    
t-1   
 
9. Arable Land per head (log)  
10. Population Density 
 
Arable Land per head and density are indicators of population pressures on land. 
It is expected that these variables will be positively associated with likelihood of 
the occurrence of a conflict. Density could also be negatively associated with 
conflict if the conflict is predominantly a rural phenomenon where there is high 
incidence of conflict with low density.  
11. Poverty Rate  
12. Relative Poverty Rate  
Most conflict literature has flagged poverty to be an important determinant of 
likelihood of a conflict. Poverty rate and relative poverty rate is expected to be 
positively related with incidence of conflict. 
     
13. Gini co-efficient (Top ten percentile monthly per capita expenditure /Bottom ten 
percentile monthly per capita expenditure) 
Income inequality has always been associated with incidences of conflict. States 
with high income inequality are also likely to be more susceptible to conflict. 
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 Socio- Political Variables(it-1) include 
14. Occurrence or incidence of conflict 
A lagged dependent variable in included in the model. There are two reasons for 
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable-First, to control for autocorrelation, 
and omitted variables (Beck and Katz 1995 and Neumayer 2005). Second, a 
theoretical reason based on ‘violence begets violence’ theory (Kaufman 1996), 
that on-going conflict in a state tends to affect the conflicts in the next year 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998 and Fearon and Laitin 2003). This is expected to be 
positively associated with the dependent variable. A favourable result may 
provide us with some evidences of vicious cycles of conflict and low rates of 
economic growth in these states. 
 
15. Percentage of largest indigenous group in total  population  
This variable will act as an indicator for the size of ethnic majority. Much of the 
recent violence in northeast has been on the lines of ethnic nationalism, 
xenophobia and illegal migration issues. It would be interesting to explore if the 
percentage of largest indigenous group in total population is associated with 
conflict. 
 
16. Police force per 100,000 people  (log) 
              Though the literature on conflict is replete with instances where high police force 
to people ratio was negatively associated with the probability of occurrence of a 
conflict, in states like Manipur where legislations like the Armed Forces Special 
Powers Act10 have had an adverse effect, the variable may be even be positively 
related to conflict. 
17. Neighbours’ conflicts  
 Codes 1 for a year if there is a conflict in which casualties are 25 and above and 
0 otherwise. Since many states in the region share each other’s borders, negative 
externalities of conflict in neighbouring state may affect a state. This variable is 
expected to be positively associated with incidences of conflict. 
18. Length of international borders in Kms (log) 
 
The illegal migration issue has been one of the major causes for conflict in 
northeast. Percentage of largest indigenous group in total population may be 
positively associated with conflict as it reflects polarisation. 
 
19. Economic Discrimination index  
20. Political Discrimination index  
 
Indices are macro coding related to the role of public policy and social practice in 
maintaining or redressing economic and political inequalities of minority groups. 
Indices are coded on a scale of 0 to 4 in which highest value represents higher 
                                                          
10 Debates on AFSPA, www.idsa.in/system/files/Monograph7.pdf 
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discrimination. These indices are expected to be positively associated with 
incidence of conflict in a state. 
 
 Dummies(it) include, 
21. A dummy for 6th schedule of Indian constitution 
 
The 6th schedule of Indian constitution provides special provisions for the 
indigenous population of North East Region in respect of property rights, self-
governance, and mode of education etc.to safe guard. A dummy with a score of 1 
for states under 6th schedule and 0 otherwise is expected to be positively related 
 
22. A dummy for agro climatic zones 
A dummy with a score of 1 for states with a high percentage of hilly area in a 
state and 0 otherwise is expected to be positively related to conflict as 
distribution of public goods are generally weak in hilly areas. States with weak 
distribution of public goods are expected to be prone to incidences conflict. 
 
23. A dummy for states with high percentage of disturbed areas under Armed Forces 
Special Powers Act (AFSPA),1958 
In states like Manipur where legislations like the Armed Forces Special Powers 
Act have had an adverse effect, the variable may be even positively related to 
conflict. A dummy with a score of 1 for states with a high percentage11 of area 
under AFSPA and 0 otherwise is expected to be positively related.  
 
6.2 Data sources 
 
The following table details the data sources for each of the variables the study proposes to 
use.  
Table 1.2 Select variables and their data sources 
Variables Data sources 
Occurrence or incidence of Conflict 
Constructed based on UCDP/PRIO dataset of Gleditsch,  
et al. (2002) Alt. sources :  The Correlates of War data, 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Newspaper 
articles 
 
Per capita NSDP Central Statistical Organisation 
Fiscal Deficit Database on economic indicators, Reserve Bank of India 
Public Debt by NSDP 
Database on economic indicators, Reserve Bank of India  
and Central Statistical Organisation 
Top percentile MPCE /Bottom 
percentile MPCE 
Household Consumer Expenditure, National Sample 
Survey, various rounds/ Data Tables, Planning 
                                                          
11 A benchmark may be set to define high percentage of area under 6th Schedule / AFSPA 
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Variables Data sources 
 commission. The gaps in the series will be interpolated 
and missing values will be extrapolated. 
Own Tax Revenue by Population Database on economic indicators, Reserve Bank of India  
Social Allocation Ratio State Budgets, Various years 
Share of mining and petroleum in 
NSDP 
Central Statistical Organisation 
Forest area in Sq. Kms (log) Census of India, Various years 
Arable Land per head (log) Census of India, Various years 
Poverty Rate 
Constructed, based on the data from Planning 
Commission of India, Government of India.  
The gaps in the series will be interpolated and missing 
values will be extrapolated. 
Relative Poverty Rate Constructed, based on poverty rate data 
Percentage of  largest indigenous 
group in total population (log) 
Census of India, Various years 
Density Census of India, Various years 
Police force per 100,000 people  
(log) 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India: 
http://www.mha.nic.in/ 
Length of international borders a 
share shares (log) 
Constructed using Maps of north-east Indian states / 
Google Maps 
Economic Discrimination index 
Minority At Risk (MAR) database: 
www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ 
Political Discrimination index 
Minority At Risk (MAR) database: 
www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ 
Neighbours’ conflicts 
Constructed based on UCDP/PRIO dataset of Gleditsch 
et al. (2002) 
Source: Constructed 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
By the end of the study we would be able to acquaint ourselves with the major determinants 
of violent conflict in North East India and the likelihood of its occurrence. Further we will be 
able to provide analyses of why economic / political discrimination may increase the risk of 
armed conflicts. The study will further look at two way causality between growth and 
incidence of conflict, interpret the results and list suitable policy suggestions for the region. 
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